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CHINA: Ten years of Anti-Monopoly Law – Its review and prospect

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ABSTRACT

China Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) was promulgated ten years ago. The prospective of China AML appeared limited but steady progress in competition policy, legal system, enforcement, international cooperation and so on. This essay looked back past decade of China AML and provided some predictions and expectations.

La loi chinoise anti-monopole (AML) a été promulguée il y a dix ans. La prospective de l'AML chinoise a connu des progrès limités mais réguliers dans la politique de la concurrence, le système juridique, l'application de la loi, la coopération internationale, etc. Cet essai a revu la décennie passée de l'AML chinoise et a fourni des prévisions et des attentes.

1. Promulgated on August 30, 2007, the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) of the People's Republic of China went into effect one year later. This paper intends to provide a concise overview of issues around its implementation in the past decade, and then makes some comments on its implementation and predictions and expectation about its future developments are made.

I. Overview and comments

1. Competition policy in initial phase with its effectiveness yet to be seen

2. The Chinese government has been working to promote a new round of economic reforms oriented to “give the full play of the basic role of the market in resource allocation” since 2013. The Communist Party of China and the central government later issued a series of guiding documents, hammering at the role played by competition policy. In a public speech made in September 2013, Xu Kunlin, the then general director of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau (PSAMB) of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), clearly put forward the idea for the first time that “the fundamental status of competition policy shall be gradually established.” Zhang Mao, the minister of the State Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC), also has stressed the significance of speeding up the establishment of the basic role played by competition policy on several occasions since 2014. On June 14, 2016, the State Council officially issued Opinions on the Establishment of Fair Competition Review System in the Building of Market System ([2016] No. 34, Document of State Council), the principles, philosophy and specific content of the Fair Competition Review system established in which have already reflected the core content of China's competition policy. However, it remains to be seen whether China's competition policy can really play a decisive role in the government's economic policies and whether relevant systems can be implemented effectively.

2. More comprehensive anti-monopoly legal system with key elements missing

3. The Guidelines on the Definition of Relevant Market issued by the Anti-Monopoly Commission under the State Council (AMC) is one of the earliest supporting norms released after the promulgation of the AML. Since 2010, NDRC, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and SAIC have been issuing a series

of departmental regulations on the enforcement of the AML which have reached dozens in total. The Supreme Court also issued a judicial interpretation on civil litigation cases involving monopolistic conducts in 2012. The administrative regulation for the implementation of the AML, the most important supporting regulation, however, is not yet in sight. It is the biggest shortcoming ever of anti-monopoly legislation. Some representatives of the National People's Congress in China have begun to call for the revision of the AML while the AML enforcement agencies have undertaken related preparatory work with experts and scholars after 2015. In China, administrative departments of the government are playing the leading role in the formulation and revision of laws, and it is rather challenging currently to coordinate the three agencies in the consolidated effort to promote the formation of anti-monopoly administrative regulations and the revision of the AML. The AMC has been actively coordinating the draft of a series of anti-monopoly guidelines—six of which have reached the final draft and shall be released in the near future, including the draft on the anti-monopoly guideline for IP rights.

3. Limited but steady progress of anti-monopoly enforcement system under way, with practical dilemmas

4. Six months into the promulgation of the AML, the new Chinese government cabinet was formed. NDRC, MOFCOM and SAIC all specified their enforcement duties of the AML, internal functional divisions and staffing respectively in accordance with the law. Over the past decade, despite the absence of revolutionary changes in the AML enforcement system, the progress has been made in many aspects of varying degrees, making small but quick and steady progress:

- First, the responsibility of the AMC and its affiliated Advisory Group has been clarified. Their working mechanism and regulations have been established and improved, with some necessary adjustments made with respect to their affiliated members;
- Second, functional divisions of the three enforcement agencies have been strengthened in different degrees—the Price Supervision and Inspection Department under NDRC was renamed as the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau (PSAMB), whose anti-monopoly offices and full-time personnel almost doubled, while 150 full-time personnel of price-related anti-monopoly were recruited nationwide; more offices in charge of the case handling were set up and an office was created for supporting the AMC within the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM; the

size of the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau under SAIC has also been expanded and the number of staffs designated to anti-monopoly issues has doubled.

5. In addition, the transparency of China's AML enforcement has also been greatly improved. SAIC has taken the lead in giving full disclosure of its written final decisions on its official website since 2013. A year later, NDRC followed its lead. The full-text decisions of conditional approval or prohibition of cases have been released and profiles of cases applicable to simplified procedure have been made known to the public at regular intervals by MOFCOM after the introduction of the simplified procedure of handling cases.

6. However, there is no denying that the progress made is not enough to completely solve the dilemma faced by the current anti-monopoly system in China. Enjoying the high administrative status, the AMC was created for coordination through consultation, with no direct enforcement power granted. A lot of its members are industry departments and regulators, which will inevitably affect the formulation and implementation of competition policy. In terms of administrative enforcement, the anti-monopoly enforcement power has been shared among different agencies, resulting in the overlapping of power thus the failure to form a consolidated force. Lower administrative rank of actual administrative enforcement departments and the shortage of manpower constrain their organizational capabilities in guaranteeing the authority and potency of the anti-monopoly enforcement.

4. International cooperation unfolding in AML enforcement

7. China has virtually integrated into the international competition community, maintaining regular meetings and exchange mechanism with the United States, the European Union, the BRIC countries and East Asian countries. Chinese government's AML officials have been regularly attending big events in the international field, the ABA section of Antitrust Law spring meeting, for instance. The Advisory Group affiliated to the AMC stages a forum on China competition policy annually, inviting domestic and foreign antitrust officials and specialists in the discussion of anti-monopoly issues in China. Regrettably, as an observer of the OECD Competition Committee, China can only attend the OECD Global Forum on Competition once a year. It is rare to see the presence of Chinese representatives in ICN, a global anti-monopoly cooperative organization. A more active participation in international anti-monopoly governance shall be achieved, with China's involvement in the drafting and developing of international rules of anti-monopoly, thus enhancing China's status in international competition community.

II. The implementation of China's AML

1. The overall implementation of the AML

8. As of the end of 2016, price-related monopoly cases that had been investigated and penalized by NDRC were 127 in number, the amount of financial penalties of which reached more than 10 billion RMB. The financial penalties of 14 out of the 127 cases were over 100 million RMB each; a total of 75 monopoly cases had been under investigation initiated by the SAIC system, 48 of which were closed and 2 of which reached compromise. A large number of administrative monopoly cases, meanwhile, were handled; the declaration of more than 1,700 merger cases had been reviewed by MOFCOM, 2 of which were prohibited, 29 of which were approved with conditions. Among those cases, those applicable to simplified procedure were basically closed within 30 days while those that had not been declared in accordance with the law were investigated and penalized, whose number gradually increased¹. In the matter of anti-monopoly civil litigation cases, as of October 2015, cases of trial of the first instance and second instance tried by courts in China were 415 and 348 in number respectively, out of which 141 and 98 cases were tried respectively in the first ten months of 2015 alone. These figures stood at only ten and six respectively in 2009².

9. NDRC undoubtedly played a stronger role in law enforcement in recent years while the number and quality of cases handled by SAIC were substantially improved in the past three years. Issues about the overlapping of responsibilities prescribed to the two agencies in some cases arose. The professional competence of MOFCOM was steadily enhancing, and its engagement in international cooperation was the most active in the three agencies. In judicial field, despite the substantial increase in the number of anti-monopoly litigation cases, the number of related civil cases as a whole was still very small, due to the lack of compensation incentives, while the administrative litigation cases involving anti-monopoly penalties were very few.

1 https://po.baidu.com/feed/share?context={%22nid%22:%22news_3456932728691558532%22} accessed on 15 May 2017.

2 See CPI(winter 2016), Interview with Judge Chuang Wang, Presiding Judge of Intellectual Tribunal, <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/interview-with-judge-chuang-wang-presiding-judge-of-intellectual-tribunal-supreme-peoples-court-of-p-r-china>, accessed on 18 February 2016.

2. Visions of competition regulation reflected from decade's implementation

10. Based on the anti-monopoly practice in the past decade, China's competition regulation presents the following tendencies:

- Firstly, the association of undertakings played a leading role in most of the cases relating to horizontal cooperation agreements that were investigated and penalized in China. These associations generally emerged from the industry administrative departments, or functioned as subsidiaries of industry regulators. Many horizontal agreements dominated by these associations were colored by the administration of the government. Many cases, therefore, were often connected with administrative monopoly. Under the intense pressure exerted by AML enforcement agencies, explicit horizontally cooperation tended to decrease, which transformed into a variety of tacit collusions or concerted conducts in recent years. The regulatory review imposed by enforcement agencies over these concerted conducts was not very radical, attaching more importance to the initiative factors behind the conspiracy when illegal conducts were identified. Besides, the loopholes in the AML were exploited, resulting in the enforcement agencies' failure to discipline the core participants in hub-and-spoke cartel.
- Secondly, AML enforcement agencies in China gradually formed their strategy in reviewing vertical agreements, namely “*prohibition in principle plus exemption for exceptions*,” based on the experience gained from the white liquor cases, milk powder cases, automobile cases, glasses cases. The determination of behavior elements of vertical agreements was strictly based on Article 14 of the AML, and the attitude towards vertical price control was different from the one in the United States—giving increasing weight to the competition analysis of individual cases—and the one in the European Union—emphasizing mutual consent of agreements. In their regulatory practice, those upstream undertakings with advantageous positions were usually punished to regulate the transaction price, by doing what the vertical price-control conducts was substantially regarded as the abuse of the superior rather than dominant market position. On the other hand, from a series of cases relating to vertical agreements that were tried by courts in China, including *Johnson & Johnson's* case, it seemed that Chinese judiciaries believed that the illegality of the vertical agreements was based on whether agreements were designed to “*eliminate or*

restrict competition.” This distinguished themselves from AML enforcement agencies, but the shared problem was that neither party valued the “mutual agreement” of vertical price control. The absence of administrative litigation cases relating to the law enforcement of vertical agreements, for the time being, avoids direct collisions between AML enforcement agencies and judiciaries over this issue.

- Thirdly, the proportion of cases involving abuse of dominant market positions to all cases was not high. The main types of conducts investigated and penalized included excessive prices (by NDRC), tie-in or adding unreasonable conditions (by SAIC). There were similar prohibitive provisions in the Price Law and Unfair Competition Law, therefore NDRC and SAIC were more experienced in investigating and handling such acts. However, evaluated from penalty decisions that had been published, the AML enforcement agencies gave more weight to the behavior elements than the analysis of competition effects, which actually was reflected in cases relating to monopoly agreements, too.
- Fourthly, the Chinese courts set out their views on issues such as the illegality of vertical agreements, two-sided markets, and the abuse of standard-essential patent (SEP). The number of litigation cases in China, including administrative and civil litigations, was pathetically less than that in the United States or in the European Union. The status of judicial organs in the entire anti-monopoly implementation system, as a result, was reduced to the one that was lower than that enjoyed by their counterparts in the United States and in the European Union.
- Fifthly, agencies or courts in China adopted a relatively positive attitude towards the AML enforcement involving IP rights. They were highly alert about the abusive conducts of IP rights—the abuse of SEP in particular. Their protection of willing licensees from the injunction imposed by SEP holders was undisguised.

11. The restraint imposed by China’s review of the concentration of undertakings was not great for most mergers in the market, and the reviewing conclusions for most of the cases were in line with that in the United States and in the European Union. For those cases with conditional approvals, the Chinese AML enforcement agency (MOFCOM) favored behavioral remedies over structural remedies, which granted greater possibility of compromise but demanded more costly supervision. On the other hand, undeclared concentration cases were mounting, partly due to the unduly low cost of violating the law as prescribed in the AML, and partly due to efforts made by MOFCOM in cracking down on such acts.

3. Controversies over the implementation of China’s AML in the past decade

12. The domestic and international review on China’s AML and its implementation is generally favorable. The strong enforcement improves and promotes China’s economic reforms. The criticism received mainly focuses on three aspects—namely, transparency, independence and neutrality. Over the past decade, with the accumulated experience and boosted confidence, the transparency of the AML enforcement in China has been experiencing substantial progress, both in procedure and in substance. The three agencies virtually make the full text of written final decisions public; for units under investigation, the right to communicate their cases is basically guaranteed in the law enforcement process; and the final decisions indicate that analysis of concerned cases are increasingly comprehensive and thorough. Although room for improvement remains, the AML enforcement agencies in China today have achieved pretty impressive results in terms of transparency, even compared with standards in the European Union and in the United States.

13. Some foreign chambers of commerce publicly voiced their criticism in 2014, claiming that the AML enforcement conducted by the Chinese government was overshadowed by industry sections and foreign-funded enterprises were subject to disproportionately stringent enforcement compared with domestically funded enterprises. In fact, the AML enforcement agencies in China have been pursuing the neutrality and independence as devotedly as their counterparts in the world. In recent years, the Chinese government raised competition policy to the forefront of government’s economic policy system. Efforts made by AML enforcement agencies, together with the appeal made by the public and enterprises, have greatly promoted the independence of the AML enforcement in China. Admittedly, as with problems faced by all countries in the world, the independence of law enforcement of competition issues is always guaranteed in relative terms.

4. Some milestone cases (merger and anticompetitive conduct) in the decade

14. *Coca-Cola/Huiyuan.* In March 2009, MOFCOM rejected the Coca-Cola’s application for the acquisition of Huiyuan Juice, which for the first time made the world aware of the existence of China’s AML.

15. *China Telecom & China Unicom case.* The year 2011 witnessed the investigation initiated by NDRC on China Telecom’s and China Unicom’s monopolistic conducts in the broadband access market. It was the first time an anti-monopoly investigation was launched against the giants in state-owned industry in China. It was followed by NDRC’s investigation into two state-owned

enterprises (SOEs) in white liquor industry and three in cement industry which, as a consequence, faced severe penalties. The law enforcement activities of this kind greatly alleviated people's concern on Article 7 of the AML in China.

16. *Qihoo 360 v. Tencent.* Qihoo filed a complaint against Tencent with Guangdong province High Court in 2011, alleging that Tencent had a dominant position and abused its market dominance in the provision of IM services in China. In 2013 the case was heard in front of the Supreme Court. China's Supreme Court took its basic stance on the definition of relevant market, the recognition of the dominant market position and related monopolistic conducts in this case (not confined to the Internet field) in 2014.

17. *Qualcomm Inc. case.* Qualcomm was fined by NDRC nearly one billion US dollars over its abuse of dominant market position in February 2015, hitting a number of records of administrative penalties imposed by the Chinese government. It also made the anti-monopoly agency in China, for the first time, the pioneer in global competition law community. Since then, anti-monopoly agencies in South Korea, the European Union and other countries and regions have launched anti-monopoly investigation into Qualcomm in succession.

III. Predictions about the future

1. Revision of the AML

18. International experience shows that the competition law shall be revised every three to five years. After years of implementation, it is necessary and feasible to revise China's AML. It is understood that the Chinese government has included the revision of the AML in its work plan, although it is still ranked as a minorly urgent project.

2. Reforms of anti-monopoly enforcement system

19. The year 2018 will see the reshuffle of the government, which is believed to bring a large-scale reorganization and transformation of the government departments. In recent years, the appeal for AML enforcement reforms in China has been voiced by all concerned parties and the demand for an independent and unified anti-monopoly authority continues. In the view of the current situation, the author reckons it as a high-probability event, too. As it should be, the reform of the enforcement system of the AML is closely linked with the revision of the AML as the two are reciprocally enhancing.

3. Focus of AML enforcement in the near future

20. In recent years, the following fields have been among the priorities of AML enforcement in China—namely, the special manufacturing industry (cement, chemicals, packaging, white liquor and milk powder), shipping industry (shipping agents, ro-ro ship transportation and ports), financial industry (insurance and securities), pharmaceutical industry (pharmaceutical raw materials and medical equipment), electronic communications (LCD panels, communication technology and broadband), urban infrastructure (water supply, gas supply and power supply) and automobiles industry (vehicles, spare parts and tires). Aiming at maintaining and promoting market competition, the focus of AML enforcement might shift to key industries in the coming years where reforms are implemented by the central government, tightening the supervision of the pharmaceutical industry as an effort to enhance the medical reform and strengthening the regulation of the abusive conducts of SEP to balance policies on IP rights. The monopoly industries that retain much of the concern of ordinary people, like urban infrastructure, oil and gas, telecommunications, etc., shall be the main concern of the AML enforcement, too. In terms of types of illegal conducts, although cases relating to monopoly agreements were in the majority of anti-monopoly cases in the past decade and the market also got a good lesson of strong law enforcement, the number of explicit anti-monopoly agreements is expected to decline, while law enforcement against the abusive acts of large enterprises will gradually intensify in the future. In addition, some emerging fields, such as the Internet, two-sided and multi-sided markets, cloud computing, blockchain technology, will be main concern of AML enforcement agencies.

IV. Some expectations

21. First of all, we hope that the Fair Competition Review system can be implemented truthfully, serving as voluntary standards for economic policies introduced by different economic sectors in China. That is how competition policy in China can play a fundamental role in economic reforms. Secondly, we advocate major reforms of the AML enforcement system in China with the formation of joint forces of the AML enforcement as the ultimate goal of the institutional reform. Thirdly, the AML, which is largely consistent with international standards and prevailing practices, shall be under necessary revisions. After years of enforcement and judicial practice, it has been tested and proved to be the one that can be well implemented. There are, however, still some defects in both its legality and policy orientation. As an example of the first concern, dominant undertakings in the hub-and-spoke cartel cases are immunized from the penalty prescribed in the AML. For the latter concern, Article 7 provokes the doubt about

its application to SOEs; the logical relationship between Articles 13, 14 and 15 is not sufficiently clear, including the definition of monopoly agreements, the main body of vertical agreements and the analysis path of monopoly agreement exemption; design defects in legal liability system cannot be overlooked. Among the punishment of monopolistic conducts, the confiscation of unlawful gains is the sword over the authority for enforcement of the AML. Fuzzy standards to be observed in the calculation

of economic penalties lead to confusing interpretation of the standards in practice. The cost of undeclared illegal acts is unduly low. These all make the AML worthy of revision. Finally, we hope that China shall keep up its efforts in the AML enforcement, as it had done in the past three years, improving its professional competence and defensibility, while maintaining or even enhancing the neutrality and independence of law enforcement. ■

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